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Decision Making in Hazard and Resource Management* 
by 
Howard Kunreuther and Paul Slavic 
Problems of decision making have been a focal point of resea~ch in 
the social and behavioral sciences over the past twenty-five years. These 
topics were introduced to geographers by Gilbert White, whose work subse-
quently sensitized economists, psychologists and sociologists to problems 
in hazard and resource management that were amenable to formal and behav-
ioral analysis. 
White has emphasized the importance of understanding how individuals 
and groups make decisions about alt.ernative programs for coping with hazards. 
Specifically, he has sought to demonstrate how empirical study of decision 
processes can aid the development and selection of public policy alterna-
tives. His concern with linking descriptive models of choice to prescrip-
' 
tions for policy is summarized in the preface of his book, Strategies of 
American Water Management: 
The theme of this volume is that by examini_ng how people make 
their choices in managing water from place to place and time to time 
we can deepen our understanding of the process of water management 
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and thereby aid in finding more suitable ends and means of manipu-
lating the natural water' system. (p. viii). 
The.present paper highlights this theme by selectively·surveying 
research on decision making and describing the implications of these 
results for hazard and resource .policy. We will indicate what has been 
learned from this research, its influence on public policy, and the pro-
mising directions for future·study. Figure 1 provides a schematic model 
which will guide our approach to deC;ision making. Decision makers collect 
and process information based on their perceptions of the environment 
and the available options. Their final choice reflects numerous con-
straints imposed by their limited ability to collect and process informa-
tion. As we shall see below, White's empiri~al analyses have deepened 
our understanding of the limitations of individual and societal decision 
making. His work reflects a concern with _the question: "What should we 
do differently now that we have learned more about human behavior?" Under-
lying this concern is a philosophy that policies and programs should 
be based on·the realities of the environment and human behavior rather 
than on unproven theoretical models. We share this perspective. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
White has been concerned with decisions made by bot4 individual 
managers and the public. We will survey the research in these two broad 
areas, concentrating on problems of hazard and resource management. The 
concluding section of the paper provides guidelines for future policy-
related research. 
I. Individual Decision Making 
What p;t'oee·c:tive actions do individuals undertake to deal with 
hazards which they face? What actions should they undertake? Some hazards, 
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such as floods, occur rarely but may produce severe damage when they do 
occur. Other hazards, such as hail, may occur more frequently but result 
in relatively little damage. Recognizing that each specific hazard requires 
a special set of protective adjustments, White made an important contribu-
tion to the literature of resource management by developing a fra~ework 
for structuring the analysis of adjustment decisions. In particular, 
he distinguished between the theoretical and practical ranges of choice: 
The theoretical range of choice open to any resource manager is 
set by the physical environment .. at a .given stage of technology. 
The practical range of choice is set by the culture and institu-
tions which permit, prohibit, or discourage a given choice (White, 
1961, p. 29). 
Consider the options open to homeowners residing in the flood plain. 
Individuals would have an opportunity to reduce the magnitude of flood 
losses by elevating their structures or adopting flood-proofing measures. 
They could deal with the financial consequences of disasters by purchasing 
insurance, relying on federal aid or bearing the loss entirely themselves. 
The practica~ range of choice open to any homeowner may be smaller than 
the above set either because of a blocked option or because of limited 
knowledge by the resident. For example, prior to 1953, the Federal govern-
ment did not have a systematic program of disaster. relief. Flood insurance 
was not available to homeowners until after 1968 when the National Flood 
Insurance Program was initiated. Techniques for reducing flood damage 
to residential:. structures in the flood plain have been effective in the 
flood plain in recent years, but many residents are still unaware of these 
possibilities. 
Table 1 depicts examples of the practical range of choice considered 
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by a homeowner on the flood plain (Ms. Waterman) and her,estimated conse-
quences to personal wealth under three different states of nature; no 
flood, mild flooding and severe flooding--with estimated probabilities 
of .90, .09, and .01, respectively. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
If there was no flooding, she would be better off not purchasing 
insurance ot elevating her house. Minor or severe flooding justifies 
both of these options in comparison with the other two. Ms. Waterman 
would also conclude that it would never be optimal for her to bear the 
loss herself if federal relief was easily available. If, on the other 
hand, there was considerable red tape in obtaining disaster relief or 
Ms. Waterman was opposed to handouts from the government, then she might 
decide to bear the loss. 
The analysis of Ms. Waterman's problem can be structured in a number 
of different ways. Decision analysis is the most sophisticated of the 
I 
methods as it forces th~ decision maker to systematically evaluate each 
alternative. Behavioral approaches, which are of more recent vintage, 
incorporate the limitations of individuals in processing information. 
We will survey these two broad approaches in the context of Ms. Waterman's 
problem. 
Decision Analysis 
Structuring the prob em to determine the relevent adjustments, e.vents, 
probabilities and consequences (as -in Table 1) is a major and crucial first 
step, still as much of an art as a science.. We shall assume the above 
structure (Table 1) and proceed to the calculations involved in comparing 
the various decision options. The methodology for determining .an optimal 
solution "requires that preferences for consequences be numerically scaled 
\, 
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in terms of utility values and that judgments about uncer·tainties be 
numerically scaled in terms of probabilities"· (Raiffa, 1968, p. x). A 
principal argument for using such an approach is that it is based upon 
a reasonable set of assumptions regarding behavior and choice. These. 
assumptions imply that the consistent decision maker behaves as if he or 
she assigns probabilities to different states of nat_1.1re (e.g., chances 
of a severe flood), assigns numerical utilities or disutilities to the 
possible results of each course of action (e.g., the disutility of a 
severe flood with no insurance protection) and then chooses the action 
yielding the highest expected utility. In other words, the theory provides 
a rational means for making decisions by prescribing the course of action 
that conforms most fully to the decision maker's own goals, expectations, 
and values. 
An integral part of the decision analysis approach is constructing 
a utility curye which reflects the value of different outcomes to the 
decision maker. In the case of Ms. Waterman, assume that she is averse 
to risk so that a gain of $100 is worth proportionately less .to her than 
a loss of $100. One way of representing this c!cttit:ud·e toward money is 
to convert dollars into utilities by presenting Ms. Waterman with a specific 
lot_tery or gamble and asking her to specify a dollar value A which 
reflects an indifference to recei~ing this amount with certainty or playing 
the lottery. For example, since she is risk averse, she might specify A 
to be $40 when presented with a lottery consisting of a coin flip to 
determine whether she has won $100 (heads) or received nothing (tails). 
By undertaking a series of such comparisons between lotteries and certainty 
equivalents, we can draw Ms. Waterman's utility curve, which enables us 
to evaluate different alternatives such as the ones in Table 1. Such a 
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curve has been drawn in Figure 2, where we have arbitrarily specified the 
relevant end points of $0 to have a utility of O and $20,000 to have a 
utility of -100. 1 
Insert Figure 2 about he.re 
We are now ready to specify an optimal choice for Ms. Waterman. The 
analysis is graphically depicted in Figure 3 by a .decision tree with small 
squares representing the options and circles representing the states of 
nature. At the end of each path, there is a disutility associated with 
a particular decisioi;t and a specific event,. For example, the expected 
utility associated with bearing the loss herself would be -2.8. 
The optimal decision for this example would be to purchase insurance, 
since the expected utility is -.10. 
White (1966) has pointed out that the resource manager may often 
want to choose a combination of adjustments to deal with a particular 
problem. Decision analysis also enables one to undertake such alterna-
tives. In the previous example, if Ms. Waterman was able to obtain 
reduced insurance premiums for elevating her house (because it was now 
less prone to flooding than before), she might have considered adopting 
both of these options. The decision tree would then have been expanded 
to include a fifth option, ;'elevate house and purchase flood insurance," 
and the expected utility computed in the same manner as outlined above. 
In summary, there are three interacting factors which jointly 
determine. the· optimal choice using the decision analysis approach: (1) the 
shape of the utility curve, (2) the estimate of probabilities of different 
states of nature, and (3) the estimates of the consequences associated 
with each alternative given a specific state of nature. In the above 
example, if Ms. Watermari has assumed that minor or severe flooding in her 
area would produce little damage to her home, then she might not have 
found insurance attractive. Similarly, if she had felt that any sort of flooding 
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in her area was" more probable, than a protective measure, such as 
elevating her house, wquld have been m~re attractive to her. If she was 
.a risk taker rather than being risk averse, her utility function would 
have had a different shape (i.e., it would have been concave rather than 
convex), and she would be uninterested in insurance or other mitigation 
measures unless the cost was subsidized. r 
Recent Extensions of Decision Analsyis 
·Recent extensions of decision analysis have focused on three general 
topics: (1) incorporating data collection processes, (2) assessing uncer...: 
tainty of unknown parameters, and (3) expressing preferences. We will 
consider each of these developments in turn, by extending the previous 
example. 
Data collection processes. The importance of costs of obtaining data 
·under conditions of uncertainty have led to the development of search models. 
These models purport to explain how individuals behave when they have 
imperfect or incomplete market information. The objective is to specify 
the optimal number of price quotations if there is, a fee associated with 
collecting infoI'!Ilation from each seller. This fee can be interpreted as 
the time and effort required to obtain this estimate. 
In·the previous example, suppose that Ms. Waterman was considering 
the possibility of elevating her house on stilts, but did not know how 
much this structural modification would cost. By obtaining different 
estimates, shw would have a clearer idea as to how much she would have 
to pay. Suppose after the first search, she received an estimate of 
$2,500. She now has to decide whether it is worthwhile to obtain another 
estimate, which may be higher or lower than $2,500. If it is lower, then 
she will h~ve improved her position (assuming that the quality of the job 
was the same).· If the second estimate was higher, she would have wasted 
-=:r::r.--.-.._...._,,._.e:::c:::,,._:r::z:::-~·r m -, --·--·arz··OJ·:c:z=:n· rrrr-..-~--~-·-··· 
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time (although she would have gained some information about the nature 
of prices in the market). The basic question addressed by these.search 
models is "How much search should be undertaken if the decision maker's 
objective is to maximize expected utility and there are benefits and costs 
associated with search. 112 In the case of Ms. Waterman, she would have 
to assess the likelihood of obtaining an estimate lower than $2,500 and 
balance this potential benefit against the costs of collecting these data. 
Assessing uncertainty. In recent years, there has been considerable 
·work that formally incorporates the cost and value of information as a 
part of the decision process. Through Bayesian analysis, one can revise 
prior est.imates of key quantities on the basis of new data. Furthermore, 
one can determine whether or·not it is worthwhile to collect further 
information. To illustrate this approach, suppose that Ms. Waterman 
feels that there is a direct relationship between the height of flooding 
of the river in her community and the magnitude of damage to her house. 
When asked what the height of the river is likely to be during the flood 
season, she gives three estimates with respective probabilities as shown 
in Table 2. These three estimates refer to the three states of nature 
(no flooding, minor flooding, or severe flooding) which enabled Ms. Water-
man to evaluate the alternative adjustments in Table 1, 
Suppose she now decided to consult historical records to obtain a 
distribution of flood heights of the river over the past fifty years. 
By combining the new information obtained from this sample with her initial 
subjective prior estimates, Ms. ~aterman could arrive at an updated or 
posterior estimate. These revised estimates would depend on the distribu-
tion of flood height and the confidence that Ms. Waterman places on the 
data. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
r 
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As should be clear, there is a direct connection between the amount 
of search which. one undertakes and the updating of information from the 
search. If, for example, Ms; Waterman was convinced that the historical 
data was an accurate depiction of the current distribution of flood 
losses, then there is likely to be little incentive for her to incur 
additional search costs. On the other hand, if she was under the 
impression that there had been structural changes in the river flow. 
in recent years, then she might want to explore this matter further. 
There is a growing literature which explicitly addresses the 
question as to the relationship between search costs, the updating of 
prior information and the choice of a final alternative (see, e.g., Howard, 
Matheson & Miller, 1976). 
Expressing preferences. Individuals may also be concerned with trade-
offs between more than one attribute when expressing their preferences. 
For example, suppose that in choosing between the adjustments in Tablel, 
Ms. Waterman is _concerned not only with the financial expenditures both 
prior and after a flood, but also with the time required to undertake each 
of the adjustments. Models have been developed to incorporate multiple 
dimensions of concern. For example, the utility associated with different 
time delays can be evaluated in much the same manner as the utility of 
money. The alternatives can then be evaluated by constructing a multi~ 
objective value function which reflects Ms. Waterman's tradeoffs between 
I 
time and cost. 
As one adds additional attributes and considers more adjustments, 
the data collection and computational process becomes more burdensome 
to the individual. Keeney and Raiffa (1976) discuss ways of simplifying 
this process, but point out that there may be, nevertheless, substantial 
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costs in obtaining the relevant data in complex decision problems. 
Behavioral Approaches 
The concept of bounded rationality developed by Herbert Simon (1959) 
:l;orms the basis for behavioral approaches to.:i individual decision making 
under conditions of uncertainty. In contrast to decision analysis, this 
approach seeks to understand what factors actually influence people's 
decision processes. The underlying philosophy is that the time and energy 
required to collect information, coupled with the decision maker's cogni-
tive limitations, lead a person to construct a simplified model of the 
world that differs in important ways from the models employed by decision 
theorists. 
An important feature of this simplified world is a strong tenden~y 
toward maintaining the status quo unless there is sufficient motivation 
for change. Rather than making the tradeoffs between the costs and 
benefits of searching for new options a person is likely to avoid 
addressing the question, "What else can I do?" unless· the current 
position is believed to be unsatisfactory. 
In cases where alternative options are presented and the decision 
maker has to make a choice, simplifying strategies are likely to be used. 
One such behavioral strategy is elimination by aspects (Tversky, 1972). 
Each alternative is viewed as a set of aspects or attributes and each 
aspect is weighted according to its relative importance in relation to 
the others in the set. The higher the weight, the more likely the aspect 
I 
will be selected for consideration. All the alternatives which do not 
contain the particular aspect are eliminated from consideration. The pro-
cess continues _until only one alternative remains. 
To illustrate the elimination by aspects model, consider the 
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alternatives listed in Table 1 plus the alternative of flood-proofing 
whereby the base of the structure is protected from minor flooding by 
a retaining wall or siding material. Table 3 depicts the four aspects 
of choice, namely, the nature of the activity, time required to obtain 
information, predisaster and postdisaster costs, ana their characteris-
tics for each of the five adjustments. The first two modify the vulner-
ability of the event (i.e., reduce the potential damage) while the other 
two distribute losses (i.e., relieve the financial burden after a disas-
3 ter). 
Insert Table 3 about here 
For the other three aspects or attributes we have assigned high, 
medium or low values. We have also assigned importance weights which 
sum to 1, to indicate how critical each aspect is to the decision maker. 
At the bottom of each column, we have listed the desired state for 
each aspect. An individual would thus prefer an alternative which modi-
fied the event, had a low predisaster cost a~d a medium~low, postdisaster 
cost and required low-medium time to adopt. Obviously no alternative 
in thisset satisfies all four of th'ese aspects. Hence, the order in 
which one selects the attributes becomes critically important in the 
final se~ection process. Figure 4 illustrates two sequences of selecting 
----·- -- -- ---,~-
the attributes and the resulting differences in final choice. In Process 
1, the nature of activity aspect is selected first and then "predisaster 
cost. 11 In Process 2, the two aspects selected are "predisaster cost" 
and "postdisaster cost," so the final choice is now di£ ferent. 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
It should be obvious from the above example that the elimination by 
aspects 'method is not optimal (i.e., does not always maximize expected 
utility). Its major weakness is that it may eliminate alternatives at 
-------------------------------------------·· 
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an intermediate stage_in the process whose ov~rall quality is c:!_ctually greater than 
those options remaining. It is used by decision makers because it is 
easy to state, defend and apply. 
Tversky (1979) has extended the elimination by aspects approach ... by 
suggesting that for many problems there is a natural order associated 
with attributes which enables one to build preference trees rather than. 
selecting an attribute at random. For example, an individual may first 
focus on predisaster cost being medium or low because he or she is con-
strained by short-run budget limitations. Only later would the other 
three elements of the problem be considered. To illustrate this approach, 
Process 2 in Figure 4 would represent one of the possible preference 
.. ·--~--------------- ---------------------....... ~ ........ ~_.-:"'--~ ... _......._ 
trees while Process 1 would not (because it focuses first on the nature of 
the activity). This approach can be looked at as setting an agenda for 
the decision maker. As the agenda or order of introducing different 
attributes varies, the choice will also vary. We will return to this 
point again in our discussion of public decision making. 
If there are a number of alternatives for consideration and 
relatively few aspects, it is likely that at the conclusion of the 
above sequential process, several alternatives will still remain. In 
this case, the decision maker may want to utilize more sophisticated 
approaches, such as decision analysis, to choose between options. 
Payne (1976) observed sm;:h a two-stage process in people's choice process 
among students choosing among apartments in experimental studies. 
Unsat~sfactory apartments were first eliminated based on certain criteria, 
after which a more thorough evaluation was undertaken for choosing 
between the reduced set of alternatives. 
A similar process was observed by White, Bradley and White (1972) 
in their study of the choice of water sources by East African households. 
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In many of the communities studied, the women rarely considered more 
/ 
than five alternative sources for water. Rather than searching for a 
particular "best" source, the women discarded options that were unsuitable 
on one or more criteria. For example, potential sources were.eliminated 
because the perceived quality of the water was deemed unsuitable or because 
the energy cost associated with obtaining the water was viewed as too 
high. Other factors which were considered important were the technological 
means associated with drawing the water and a social element, that is, 
a concern with meeting or avoiding.certain individuals who frequented a 
particular water source. Even after a set of alternative sources were 
' 
rejected? there still maY. have been more than one sour.ce remaining. At 
this stage of the choice process, the East African women were more likely 
to trade off one attribute against another (e.g.,·quality of water with 
energy cost) in making their final decisions. 
According to White, Bradley and White, the decision process utilized 
by the East African peasants was lexicographic in nature. In this approach, 
each attribu:te is ranked in the order of its importance and a prespecified 
standard is set. All alternatives which did not meet a given standard 
are deemed unsatisfactory. In contrast to elimination by aspects, the 
lexocographic mo.del of choice assumes that there is a :Uxed prior ordering 
of attribu·tes so that the choice process is deterministic once this set 
of priorities is known. To illustrate, assume that the East African 
. ' 
household ranks quality, technological difficulties and energy costs in 
that order. In other words, this particular decision rule would choose 
the source which had minimum energy costs, but met minimum quality stan-
dards. and technological constraints. If no alternative met the minimum 
quality constraint, then the criterion would have to be lowered until at 
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least one option satisfied it. If no source met the technological con-
straints, then the one which carrie closest to doing so would be chosen. 
Individuals may decide to order attributes in different ways depending 
on their specific preferences. Thus, an individual who wants to avoid 
certain people at all costs might choose social relationships as his first 
attribute and only consider sources which were not frequented by those 
people. 
----·-·-~--- ---·---------- ----·------~------
Recent ·Extensions of Behavioral Approaches 
-~----~---- ------....---~ ------·~·--~- -~-~ -· ·-··-----·-.__·--
In recent years, descriptive models have been investigated through 
field surveys and laboratory experiments. This work can be categorized 
under the same three general problem areas that have guided recent research 
in extending decision analysis. These areas, data collection processes, 
assessment of uncertainty, and the expression of preferences are considered 
below. 
Data collection processes. Research in this area has focused on 
the factors which influence the decision to collect data arid the sources 
of information under conditions of uncertainty. Laboratory experiments 
on insurance decisions (Slovic et al., 1977) have shown that people are 
often unwilling to protect themselves against events with a low probabil-
ity of occurrence (e.g., 1 in 1,000) even though the potential loss from 
the event would be relatively high~ (e.g., $1,000) and insurance was actu-
arilly fair (e.g., $1) or even subsidized ($.90). These results suggest 
that in some situations, people are not inclined to worry about the poten-
tial losses from a future disaster if they perceive its probability to 
be below some threshold. The threshold concept assumes that there are 
I 
I 
only so many things in life an/individual aan worry about. People are 
forced to restrict their attention to events that they feel are sufficiently 
. probable to warrant protective!action. 
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Most low probability events involve the type of transactions where, 
in addition to price, an indivJdual's behavior is influenced by nonmarket 
forces such as media exposure dr advice from friends and neigh,bors ~- Some 
. I' 
of these features have been captured by a sequential model of choice which 
has been examined using data fjom a field survey of 3,000 homeowners 
residing in hazard-prone areas (Kunreuther et al., 1978a). According to 
this model, a person is reluctant to collect data on protection ~gainst 
hazards unless motivated to do so by some external event such as a recent 
disaster. Even then, the person may only seek information from easily 
Such a sJquential model of choice suggests that 
individuals fail to protect thJmselves because of limited knowledge rather 
accessible sources. 
than unattractive cost:;,.benefit considerations. The sequential model 
describes how different environmental events and behavior.of-other 
1 ff · d. ·d 1 · I peop ea ect in ivi ua action. 
Evidence from the social Jciences forms the basis for this 
·sequential model of the data· cd11ection process. A series of cross-
cultural field surve
0
ys summariJed by White (1974) and Burton, Kates and 
I White (1978) reveal the limited ability of individuals to deal with 
information about natural haza~
1
1ds. In the latter book the three 
geographers characterize individual behavior related to hazard adjust-
ments by postulating that the dhoice process does not begin unless a~· 
. I , 
first threshold of awareness 0£ actual or anticipated loss is reached. 
Th h · h · I f , · · · · h. e aut ors suggest t e importance o past experience in triggering tis 
awareness. With respect to thJ diffusion of information there is·a large 
. I 
empirical literature on the dififusion of innovations (see Rogers & Schoe-
. I 
maker, 1971) which consistentlj shows that most individuals are first 
made aware of a product or of a protective mechanism through the mass 
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media. Before purchasing the ~tern they are likely to turn to friends 
i 
or neighbors for additional data which may not have been available to 
them from initial source~ of kjowledge. 
Personal communication mai also be a particularly important 
source of information because yhere is a tendency to implicitly·trust 
the judgment of a friend or coileague. In addition, accepting the judgment 
i 
or advice of friends develops ~nd strengthens social relationships which 
are viewed as desirable ends 1J themselves. After discussing a new 
I 
product with someone who has adopted it, one is likely to feel' that this 
person has carefully evaluated the information on which to base a 
By making such an a1sumption, which may not necessarily be 
correct, an individual considering the purchase of a new product can 
' 
decision. 
justify not having to collect detailed information. 
I 
Further light has been shJd on the accuracy of people's perception 
! 
of risk by Kunreuther et al.·. d978b). When homeowners participating 
in the field survey were asked to estimate the chances of a severe flood 
or earthquake damaging their property in the next year, 15 percent of 
the ,respondents in flood areas land 8 percent of those in earthquake 
areas were unable to provide aqy sort of estimate. Of those who did 
I 
respond, some thought the probability of a disaster hitting them next 
I 
year was quite large--at least lone chance in ten--ret they said they 
had purchased no disaster insurance even though they knew it was avail-
able. Others believed the chaJce of a disaster affecting them was 
miniscule--1 in 100,000--yet tJey had purchased disaster insurance. 
I 
' " 
These findings raise the quest~on as to how well individuals understand 
i the concept of probability or know how to incorporate it into their de-
cisions. It also suggests tha~ there may be other factors influencing 
17 
choices which are not evident to researchers. 
I 
Assessing uncertainty. E~ficient adjustment to natural hazards 
I 
i 
demands an understanding of th~ probabilistic character of natural events 
and a desire to think in pr~ba~ilistic terms. Because of the. importance 
of probabilistic reasoning to decision making in general, a great deal 
hlas been. of recent experimental effort devoted to understanding how 
people perceive, process, and Jvaluate the probabilities of uncertain 
Alh h .. ·.lh· .b h hl f . events. t oug no systematic t eory a out t e psyc o ogy o uncertainty 
has emerged from this descriptJve work, several empirical generalizations 
I 
have been established. Perhap~ the most widespread conclusion is that 
I 
people do not follow the prindlples of probability theory in judging 
! 
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the likelihood of uncertain ev~nts. When estirilating·probabilities, 
people.rely on mental strategi~s.(heuristics) that sometimes produce 
good estimates, but all too often yield serious biases (Slavic, Kun-
reuther &White, 
Some of the most dramatic demonstrations of these.sorts of biases 
come from a series of laboratory experiments conducted by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974). One heuristic documented in these studies is that 
of availabilit;¥, according to which one jud·ges the probability of an event 
(e.g., a severe flood) by the ease with which relevant instances are 
imagined or by the number of such instances that are readily retrived 
from memory. Any factor which makes a hazard highly memorable or imagin-
able--such as a recent disaster or a vivid film or lecture--could increase 
the perceived risk of the hazard. According to this bias one would expect 
that personal experience with misfortune would play a key role in an 
individual's estimate of the probability of a future disaster. 
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There are extensive field data indicating that the risks of natural 
and other hazards are misjudged in ways predictable from labqratqry 
research. For example, the biasing e.ffects. of. availability are evident 
in the observations of Kates (1962; p. 140): 
A major limitation to human ability to use improved flood 
hazard infoni~atidn is a basic reliance on experience. Men o.n 
flood plains appear to be very much prisoners of their experience 
Recently experienced floods appear to set an upward bound to the 
size of loss with which managers believe they ought to.be concerned. 
Kates further attributes much of the difficulty in achieving better. 
flood control to the "inability of individuals to·conceptualize floods 
thathave never occurred" (p. 92). He observes that, in making forecasts 
of future ~lood potential, individuals "are strongly conditioned by 
their immediate past and limit.their extrapolation to simplified constructs, 
seeing the future as a mirror of that past" (p. 88). In this regard, it 
is •intet:es-ting to .observe how the purchase· of earthquake insurance int"":. 
creases sharply after a quake, but decreases steadily thereafter, as the 
memories become less vivid (Steinbrugge, McClure & Snow, 1969). 
Some hazards may be inhel'."ently more memorable than others. For 
example, one would expect drought, with its gradual onset and offset, 
to be much less. memorable, and thus less accurately perceived, than. 
flooding.· Kirkby (1972) provides some evidence for this hypothesis in 
her study of Oaxacan farmers. Kirkby also found that memory of salient 
natural events seems to begin with an.extreme event, which effectively 
blots out recall of earlier events and acts as a fixed point against 
which to calibrate later points. A similar result was obtained by 
Parra (1971), studying farmers in the Yucatan. Parra found that awareness 
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of a lesser drought was obscured if it had been followed by a more severe 
drought. He also observed that droughts were perceived as greater in 
severity if they were recent and thus easier to remember. 
Additional demonstrations of availability bias come from studies 
by Lichtenstein, Slavic, Fischhoff, Layman and Combs (1978) which showed 
that frequencies of dramatic cases of death such as accidents, homicides, 
botulism and tornadoes, all of which get heavy media coverage, tend to 
be greatly overestimated. In contrast, the frequencies of death from 
unspectacular events, which claim one victim at a time· and are common 
in nonfatal form (e.g., asthma, emphysema, diabetes) are greatly under-
estimated. A follow-up study by Combs and Slovic (1979) showed that 
these biases in judgment were closely related to the amount- of coverage 
given to the various causes of death by the news media. 
One would expect that. since people have a,great deal of difficulty 
thinking about uncertainty, they would tend to view the world as more 
certain than it is. Evidence supporting this hypothesis comes from the 
work of Kates (1962) who found that flood plain dwellers used a number 
of mechanisms for dispelling uncertainty, such as either denying the 
risks from flooding or perceiving floods as repetitive or cyclical phe-
nomena. 
Expressing preferences. Once the consequences of.a decision have 
been enumerated and their uncertainty assessed, some value must be attached 
to them. When it comes to tradeoffs between such issues as de.aths today 
vs. deaths in the future or between economic development and possible 
catastrophic natural disasters, we have little choice but to ask people 
for their opinions. Unfortunately, for such unfamiliar and complex 
issues, people may not have well-defined preferences. Fischhoff, Slovic, 
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and Lichtenstein (1980) show that values may often be incoheren.t, not 
thought through. For example, in thinking about risk, we may be unfam-
iliar with the terms in which issues are formulated (e.g., social discount 
rates, miniscule probabilities, or megadeaths). We may have contradictory 
values (e.g., a strong aversion to catastrophic losses of life and a 
realization that we are not more moved by a plane crash with 500 fatalities 
than one with 300). We may occupy different roles in life (parents, 
workers, children) which produce clear-cut but inconsistent values. We 
may vacillate between incompatible, but strongly held, positions (e.g., 
bicycles are an important mode of transpor·tation, but are too dangerous 
to be allowed on most streets). We may not even know how to begin 
I 
thinking about some issues (e.g., the appropriate tradeoff between the 
opportunity to dye one's hair and a vague, minute increase in the prob-
ability of cancer twenty years from now). Our views may undergo changes 
over time (say, as we near the hour of decision or the consequence itse_lf) 
and we may not know which view should form the basis of our decisions. 
In such situations, where we do not know what we want, the values 
we express may be highly labile. Subtle changes in how issues·are posed, 
questions are phrased and responses are elicited, can have marked effects 
on our expressed preferences. The particular question posed may evoke 
a central concern or a peripheral one; it may help clarify the respondent's 
opinion or irreversibly shape it; it may even create an opinion where 
none existed before. 
Three features of these shifting judgments are important. Fi'rst, 
people are typically unaware of .the potency of such shifts in ·their 
perspective .. Second, they often have no guidelines as to which perspec-
tive is the appropriate one, and finally, even when there are guidelines, 
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people may not want to give up their own inconsistency, creating an 
impasse (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, in press). 
Behavioral resea.rch depicts the process of choice to be one based on 
incomplete and often biased information and simplistic decision rules for 
evaluating alternatives. Studies have shown that one's decisions are 
typically guided by past ·experience or personal discussions'with other 
people rather than by a detailed comparison of the cost~ and benefits 
of different alternatives. 
From a policy perspective, decision analysis is neutral with regard 
---··----:..---··~-.. -·--·- -~--- -
to the optimal locus of decision making. In contrast, those who have been 
influenced by behavioral analysis contend that ·people may not act in 
their own best interest because of.limited or biased inforriiatiotJ.. They 
argue that if·thereare.major societal costs which are incurred because 
of "poor" decisions by:,individuals, some form of regulatory control may be 
necessary. Thus they would. favor land.use regulations if it was found 
that individuals were not sensitive to the hazards they £iced. They would 
also support some form of .required insurance if empirical data revealed 
that individuals were not willing to protect themselves voluntarily (e.g., 
the Flood Disaster Protection Act: of 1973, which required ai1,:new homeowners 
to purchase flood insurance as a condition for a federally financed mort-
gage). We will elaborate on these policy implications in the concluding 
section where we discuss guidelines for·future research. 
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II. Public Decision Making 
The broad area of hazard and resource management frequently requires 
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investments in projects such as flood control dams which affect large 
numbers of individuals. These public goods have two principal 
characteristics which differentiate them from products offered on 
the market such as insurance, flood proofing materiils or wooden 
pilings for elevating one's house. The costs are so high and the 
individual gets such a small share of the benefits that he or she 
has no incentive to purchase it. Furthermore, an individual will 
benefit when others provide the goods, so there is no incentive to 
pay for it. For example, if half of the community paid for a flood 
control dam the other half would, still be given the same protection. 
One of the main justifications for the existence of government programs 
in hazard and resource management is to provide citizens with such 
public goods as highways, national defense and flood control projects 
that would not otherwise be provided by the public sector. 
In this sec,tion we will examine alternative approaches for dealing 
with the allocation of limited governmental funds among competing 
projects. Until recently benefit-cost analysis has been the principal 
tool employed in this process and we will review its concepts first. 
White has been one of the leaders stressing the importance of including 
multiple objectives explicitly in the analysis andwe will indicate the 
types of models of choice which come under the broad heading of 
multi-objective planning.· Finally, there has also been considerable 
interest by White and others in behavioral questions on how existing 
institutions as well. as disasters and crises affect public· decision 
making. We will conclude this section by'touching on work in this area. 
Benefit-Cost Analysis 
Benefit-cost analysis systematically incorporates tangible and 
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intangible benefits and costs of different projects in much the same way 
as decision analysis does. The decision maker lists a set of alternative 
options, and then determines possible outcomes under different states 
of nature. The alternative which produces the greatest net benefit 
(total benefit minus total costs) is considered ,the most desirable one. 
The tool was originally utilized in evaluating water resource projects 
in the 1930's but it has had widespread use only since World War II. 
To illustrate the application of benefit-cost analysis, consider 
the decision by the Corps of Engineers as.to whether they should invest 
in flood control Project A or Bon a given river basin. In order to 
determine the expected benefits from each project, they have computed 
the expected annual savings in flood damage (i.e., probabilities times 
damages avoided from building the dam) to the community for the next' 
4 fifty years appropriately discounted to the present. Similarly, the 
costs of each project are discounted to the present year so an appro-
5 priate comparison can be made. A summary of the relevant figures 
' 
appears below in Table 4. As we can see from these values, Project B 
has a higher net benefit to society but assists primarily the upper 
income group. Project A protects primarily low income individuals 
who comprise the flood plain. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
The above example does not distinguish between the benefits from 
each of the projects accruing to the federal government and to the local 
communi~y and hence ignores cost-sharing issues. The importance of,making 
this distinction can be illustrated by two·contrasting examples of 
disaster programs. Suppose federal disaster relief or subsidized flood 
insurance provides recovery funds for a substantial portion of flood 
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losses; then the construction of a project will mean a reduction in 
federal disaster expenditures. If, on the other hand, flood victims 
in a community rely on their own resources for recovery, then the federal 
government stands ·;to gain little financially from a flood con,trol 
project. In the, latter case, potential victims may want to place 
pressure on their local government to help build the project with 
their own funds. The,issue of cost-sharing between federal and local 
governments thus has important implications for efficient resource 
development. Until recently, agencies like the U.S: Corps of Engineers 
required relatively little cost-sharing by local governments for 
large flood projects, but specified higher percentages for other 
techniques such as channel improvements, levees and diversion channels. 
Marshall (1970), who analyzed data for 34 Crops projects authorized by 
the 1968 Flood Control .Act, found that the local cost sharing .ranged 
from O percent for large reservoirs to approximately 50 percent for 
some levees and channel i~provements. There was considerable variance 
in the cost-sharing amounts for.:the same· type of projects in different 
regions of the country. 6 
One of the important current issues in cost-benefit analysis is, 
the proportion of costs that local interests should be required to 
absorb for specific projects. Marshall (1973) has shown that an associa-
tion rule, whereby local beneficiaries are charged a percent of the cost 
share equal to the ratio of marginal local benefits to marginal national 
benefits computed at the nationally efficient scale of output, induces 
local interests to select the nationally efficient project design. 
' Furthermore, he points out that there needs to be consistency between 
the cost-sharing practices of different agencies as well as between 
---~------------~----~ ---~--- - -
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different techniques such as structural and non-structural measures. 
On a theoretical level, this type of analysis makes excellent 
sense. The challenge fromfhepoint of view of evaluating alternative· 
cost-sharing rules is determining what .the national and local benefits 
are likely to be for different types of projects, and understanding how 
local constituencies decide on whether they will sanction a particular 
project given a fixed percentage of c_ost they must assume. There is 
thus a need to understand the decision processes of governmental units 
and to collect detailed information on the effects of different actions 
before deciding on a particular course of action. 
Multi~Objective Planning 
One of the principal criticisms leveled at benefit-cost analysis is 
that is focuses almost entirely on economic ef_ftciency criteria without 
concern for other objectives such as income redistribution (Maass, 1965).· 
One way of coping with equity considerations is to utilize other means 
such as transfer payments to low income residents rather than explicitly 
incorporating other objectives into'the analysis. In the above.example, 
Project B would still be' deemed mo"st desirable ~md special grants from tax-
payers' mon~y could be given low-income flood victims. 
An alternative approach is to-incorporate explicit],.y income distri-
bution and other goals of a particular project as part of a multicriterion 
objective function. White and his colleagues on the Committee of Water (1968) 
went to great lengths to highlight the diverse objectives which must be taken 
into account when planning for water management of the Colorado River. 
Aside from the standard national economic efficiency goal, four other 
"aims were suggested: (1) income redistribution, (2) political equity, 
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(3) controlling the natural environment, and (4) preservation and 
aesthetics. The report indicated the nature of these different objec-
tives, but left it to the policy maker to determine how tradeoffs 
between them should be made. 
This concern with incorporating multiple objectives into analyzing 
resource management projects was expressed by the U.S. Water Resources 
Cquncil (WRC) who in 1973 ad~pted principles and standards which 
indicated that the beneficial and adverse effects of projects be 
assessed under four general accounts: national economic development 
(NED), environmental quality (EQ), regional economic development (RED), 
and social well being (SWB). The 1979 WRC Principles and Standards for 
Planning Water and Land Resources emphasized the importance of evalua-
tion of NED and DQ and then provided detailed guidelines for quantita-
tively measuring the beneficial and adverse effects of each of these 
two objectives. The document, however, notes that "the statement of 
the objectives and specification of their components in these standards 
is without implication concerning priorities to be given to them in the 
process of plan formulation and evaluation" (p. 72981). 
' _; 
Considerable effort has been spent over the past tw~ty years on 
ways that a multicriterion objective function can be evaluated by a 
policy maker in a systematic manner. After stating the objectives of 
the policy proposal, one has to define attributes which can measure 
how well each alternative meets specific objectives. For example, 
one attribute measuring NED might be "number of new jobs created." 
There are likely to be several attributes which map onto each objective. 
In the case of qualitative objectives, it may be more difficult to 
define a set of attributes. For example, how does one measure 
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"environmental quality" in a quantitative manner? One way to get a 
handle on this objective is to divide it into subobjectives (e.g., 
creating recreational opportunities, preserving wildlife) which may 
then suggest specific attributes (e.g.' number of visitor days i_n 
a park). 
If there are several attributes describing a given objective, then 
appropriate weights must be given.to them. If the, attributes are 
independent of each other then one estimates the utility function for 
each attribute separately in a manner similar to that described in the 
previous section (see Figure 1). One then determines scaling constants 
to specify the appropriate weights in the overall objective function. 
The process is somewhat more complex if attributes are dependent. 7 
It is questionable how well the process is likely to work in practice. 
It requires a considerably sophisticated policy maker and does not 
explicitly incorporate the decision processes of different individuals 
and stakeholders. 
A related approach is goal programming whereby the policy makers 
set specific desired goals for particular objectives and a penalty 
function associated with deviating from these goals. It is then 
possible to develop a formal model for evaluating the impact of different 
alternatives on the multi-criterion objective function. In essence, 
this approach is a hybrid between a lexicographic model and a mul"ti-
attribute utility model. Acceptable levels are set as in a lexico-
graphic approach but deviations below this level and simultaneous 
I 
consideration of alternatives take place as in a multiattribute utility model. 
!];here is still an·operi question as to ·how different weights'~hould. 
be determined for the different goals and whether such a multi-objective 
---------~-=-------------------------------------------
8 function captures the decision process. 
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An alternative theory of measurement has recently been proposed 
by Saaty (1977). His methodology consists first of decomposing the 
problem into relevant attributes and th~n combining them,to make an 
overall choice. Rather than asking individuals to estimate utility 
functions for each attribute he only requires them to make 
pairwise comparisons which can be combined in a way that reflects the 
decision makers' preferences. For example, consider the five objectives 
for the Colorado River project investigated by White and his Committee 
on Water. The policy analyst would have to make ten pairwise compari-
sons across those objectives which reflected the relative importance 
he attached to each one in relation to another. For example, the analyst 
would be asked to specify the importance of the national economic 
efficiency goal relative to income redistribution; the income 
redistribution goal relative to preservation and esthetics; and so 
forth. If each objective was subdivided into a set of attributes, 
a similar set of comparisons would have to be made at this level. 
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Multiattribute utility models, goal programming and Saaty's 
scaling method assume that there is a single decision maker who must 
determine a course of action based on his or her estimates of 
appropriate weights and utilities. If there are several interest 
groups represented (e.g., the flood plain resident, the general 
taxpayer, representatives from different state, federal and local 
agencies) then each one is likely to have their own rankings 
with respect to the importance of different attributes and objectives. 
Either some type of weighting scheme has to be assigned to the 
preferences of each of these different ;i.;nterest groups or some type 
of consensual procedure such as a nominal group and delphi processes9 
must be employed. 
29 
Understanding Public Decision Making 
On the descriptive side there has been an interest in understanding 
the impact of different institutional arrangements and specific events 
such as disasters on public policy formulation. White (1969) indicates 
that there are three principal ways that state and federal agencies· 
can gauge people's attitudes toward possible solutions to their 
problems. The public hearing is most democratic, permitting citizens' 
groups, industries and other special interests to state their points 
of view. A second method is Congressional committee hearings which 
are held as part of budget agency recommendations or for determining 
the need for special legislation. White feels that by far the most 
impor·tant sources of public preferences are the informal comments 
from differe~t citizens' groups, lobbyists and other interested 
parties. The role of personal contact and informal networks in 
influencing strategies and final courses of action have a parallel in 
the studies of the individual decision ·making, process where friends 
and neighbors play a key role in influencing choice. 
Although the above three institutional arrangements provide insight 
in~o how information is elicited by public agencies, they do not indicate 
how the actual choice process is made. ·one of the most interesting 
studies on this question was a description of the decision making process used 
by the Delaware River Basin Commission in their analysis of water 
quality on the Delaware River (Kneese & Bowar, 1968; Haefele, 1973). A 
system of advisory committees.provided estimates of costs and benefits 
of five different alternatives with respect to water quality. These five 
alternatives (one of which was the status quo) were then presented at a 
public hearing where different groups were able to voice their concerns 
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and state their preferences. Finally, the actual choice decision was 
made by an interstate compact with three state commissioners, each 
having one vote. After considerable discussion, the conunission chose 
water quality standards falling somewhere between the two choices 
favored by almost everyone at the public hearings. 
The Delaware River Basin Commission study on water quality utilized 
existing institutional mechanisms to evaluate the benefits and costs 
of a set of alternatives. Furthermore, there was general agreement by 
all parties as ,to what were the preferred alternatives. One reason 
for this is that the benefits of improved water quality were restricted 
solely to the recreation option. 
When there are a number of projects to be considered and a number 
of different attributes are relevant, then the decision making process 
may be somewhat more complicated than the one followe~ by the Dela-
ware River Basin Commission. 10 In this case, the ordering of 
different attributes, or more generally the construction of an agenda, 
may play a key role in the final decision. We have already discussed 
this point in.the section:ion individual decision making by indicating 
how descriptive techniques such as elimination.by aspects or preference 
trees will yield different choices depending on which aspects are chosen 
first. Similar results have been shown to hold for group decision pro-
cesses where changes in the agenda have influenced outcome processes. 
' One of the most interesting recent studies to explore agenda effects 
was by Plott and Levine (1978) who demonstrated that one could change 
the probability that certain types of planes would be purchased by a flying 
club by altering the order in which aspects pertinent to the decision 
were considered. They also replicated their results .in a series of 
. ' 
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laboratory experiments. A simple example in the water resources area illus-
trates the i~portance of agenda setting on decisions. Suppose that a com-
mittee is deciding which water resources projects to fund and is consider-
ing two regions (Florida and Louisiana) and whether project costs should 
exceed B dollars. One agenda might determine the set of available proj.ects 
by initially focusing on cost and then on location. Another agenda 
would reverse the order. The group choice may yield a different solution 
depending upon which question is presented first. 11 
Frequently the agenda is ordered by external events such as 
disasters or crises which focus attention on specific remedies. White 
and Haas (1975) point out that most Federal legislation on natural 
hazards follows within a few months or a year of a major disaster. The 
. 12 history of the flood insurance program illustrates this point. 
· Severe flooding in the nor'theastern states in 1955 created a clamor 
among victims for a government-backed insurance program. As a result, 
Congress passed the Flood Insurance Act of 1956 which provided for 
government subsidized rates, but Congress refused to appropriate the 
funds for the program because there were serious questions raised both 
within government and by outsiders as to the potential harmful'effects 
on flood plain development of instituting a uniform set of premiums 
by river basins. 
Two fortuitous events helped .to iaunch the National Flood Insurance 
program. The Bureau of the Budget appointed a Task Force on Federal 
Flood Control Policy which explicitly recognized the need for a different 
type of flood insurance program and indicated how such coverage could 
be related toother types of adjustments such as land use regulation. 
At approximately the same time·, Hurricane Betsy devastated a large 
portion ot the Gulf Coast including New Orleans. As a result, a Congres-
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sional task force was authorized to undertake a study on the feasibility 
of some form of federal flood insurance. The r.esults of this study, coupled 
with the ;rask Force Report, culminated in the National Flood Insurance 
Act of 1968. 
The most recent ~hange in the flood insurance program was triggered 
by Tropical Storm Agnes in 1972. Many communities struck by these 
disasters had not entered the flood 'insurance program, and hence 
residents could not buy coverage. In other communities where flood 
insurance was available (including Wilkes Barre) few residents had 
I 
voluntarily purchased coverage.' This lack of vo1untary interest in 
the program on the part of homeowners and communities induced Congress 
to pass the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973. which required insurance 
---- -----w~-·~,.-~ • 
as a condition for any mortgage or home loan partially or fully financed 
by the f,ederal government. 
This brief summary of the impact of flood disasters on insurance 
policy suggests a behavioral model of .choice for public decision making 
\ 
which has similar features to the sequential model for individuals: 
Stage !--Awareness of the problem. This is frequently triggered by 
a disaster with its resulting inequities or by some concern by Congress 
in reviewing the performance of a given program. 
Stage 2--Examination of feasible alternatives. 'Through a task force 
report and/or public hearings, a set of options is outlined for possible 
adoption. 
Stage 3--Choosing an option. Either the proposed program is 
rejected because its costs are likely to exceed its benefits (Federal 
Flood Insurance Act of 1956) or the program is adopted (National Flood 
Insurance Act of 1968). 
Stage 4--Reevaluation of choice. Should the program be unsuccessful 
in meeting its objectives, then it will be reexamined. Policy makers 
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are then made aware of a problem and have reentered Stage 1. The. 
reexamination of the Flood Insurance Program after Tropical Storm 
Agnes illustrates .this phase of the process. 
Future Research Directions 
Our survey illustrates the motivating forces behind the alterna-
tive approaches to decision making under uncertainty. Tools such as 
decision analysis and cost-benefit analysis are primarily concerned 
with ways to improve behavior, hence they are prescriptive in nature. 
Behavioral analyses look at how the world_ actually works, hence the concern 
with institutional arrangements and decision processes. These approaches 
are descriptive in nature. White would like to see policies designed 
with sensitivity to both prescriptive and descriptive considerations. 
It is in this_ spirit that we will offer a few suggestions for 
future research in the two broad areas surveyed above. 
--------
Individual Decision Making 1 
In the area of individual decision making, we need to develop 
techniques for structuring the decision problem. The logic of decision 
analysis cannot be applied until the alternatives, critical events, 
and outcomes are specified. We need algorithms for accomplishing this 
and for simplifying the large, complex.decision trees that may result. 
Crisis situations, where stakes are high, time is short, and the 
alternatives and information a:rre .. continually changing, pose part:i:cularly 
difficult structuring problems. 
Subjective judgments of probability and value are essential 
inputs to decision analyses. We still do not know the best ways to 
elicit these judgments. Now that we understand many of the biases 
to which judgments are susceptible, we need to develop debiasing 
techniques to minimize their destructive effects: Simply warning a 
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judge about a bias may prove ineffective. Like perceptual illusions, 
many biases do not disappear.upon being identified. It may be 
necessary to (a) restructure the judgment task in ways that circumvent 
the bias, (b) use several ·different methods allowing opposing biases to 
cancel one another, or (c) correct the judgments externally, based on 
an estimate of the direction and strength of the bias. 
Much progress has been made recently toward understanding judgmental 
and decision making processes. We need to continue this pursuit of basic 
knowledge. Simon (1965, p. 92) outlining the historical development of 
writing, the number system, calculus, and other major aids to thought, 
indicates the importance of synthesizing descriptive and prescriptive 
approaches. 
All of these aids to human thinking, and many others, were 
devised without understanding the process they aided--the thought 
process itself. The prospect before us is that we shall understand 
that process. We shall be able to diagnose the difficulties of 
a ••. decision maker •.. and we shall be able to help him 
modify his problem solving strategies in specific .ways. 
We have no experience yet that would allow us to judge what 
improvement in human decision making we might expect from the 
application of this new and growing knowledge Nonetheless, 
we have reason, I think, to be sanguine at the prospect. 
Public Decision Making 
In the doc].f~~nt', Water and Choice in the Colorado Basin, White and 
his colleagues detailed a set of objectives and alternatives for managing 
the Colorado River Basin. The report offers prescriptive policy 
suggestions while recognizing the constraints imposed by existing 
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institutional arrangements. Thus, it proposes that a set of plans, 
which involve structural and nonstructural methods, be developed which 
explicitly recognizes the objectives of different parties and insti-
tutional or cultural constraints which.limits the range of choice. 
The study of the Colorado River basin provides guidance to policy 
makers as to how one might d'evelop a strategy for evaluating alternative 
programs. It does not, however, address the question as to ·what is 
likely to emerge.from this activity. In this connection, the Federal 
Flood Loss Reduction Program which was the result of the 1966 Bureau 
of the Budget task force which White chaired offers a blueprint for 
a plan of action. The principal recommendation of this task force is 
that both structural measures such as dams and protection works and 
nonstructural means (e.g., land use and building regulations, warnings, 
flood insurance) be considered in coping with flood problems. 
Despite the public commitment to this program, there have been 
severe problems in actually implementing a multiple means strategy. 
The many.agencies involved in the flood problem, conflicting objectives 
and limited data, have made it extremely difficult to coordinate pro-
grams .in flood-prone communities. On the positive side, a direct outcome 
of this task force report was the National Flood Insurance Program 
with its emphasis on land-use regulations and building codes as a 
condition for subsidized insurance. ,· 
One way to .facilitate communication among agencies with a common 
data base is to develop some form of decision support system for analyzing 
resource management problems. .The term "decision support system" implies 
the use of computers to: 
1. Assist managers in their decision processes. 
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2. Support, rather than replace, managerial judgment. 
3 I . h ff ' f d · · k' 13 . mprove tee ectiveness o ec1s1on ma ing. 
The key feature of a decision support system is that it enables policy 
makers and interested users to experiment with alternative sets of 
scenarios in the confines of their office or agency: The computer 
plays a key role in facilitating data analysis, standardizing the data 
bases so that different agencies have common points of communication and 
enabling relatively easy comparisons of costs and benefits of different 
programs. 
At a des.criptive level, a group at the University of Pennsylvania 
have developed an interactive decision support system for disaster 
. ) 
policy analysis in the hopes that it will facilitate the decision and 
choice process ot resource managers (see Kunreuther et al., 1978b). 
The modeling system can deal with sets of individual homeowners and 
businesses. This feature enables the user to construct representations 
of hazard-prone communities and exa~ine impacts of mitigation and 
recovery programs on inhabitants as well as on external sectors such 
as federal, state and local governments. 
To illustrate the use of decision support systems in a specific 
problem context, consider the evaluation of alternative flood plain 
management programs. Any adjustment or combination of adjustments 
wilL_impact on a number of different stakeholders. Not onlr are the 
/ 
residents and businesses of the flood plain directly or indirectly 
affected, but so are the general taxpayers who have to pay part of 
the disaster bill. Businesses and industrial concerns such as the 
insurance industry, financial institutions, the construction and real 
estate industry are also impacted by hazard mitigation and recovery 
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programs. 
Figure .5 illustrates the interaction among alternatives and 
stakeholders affected by particular measures. The first four items 
represent simple adjustments for dealing with flood plain management; 
the remaining alternatives would be a·combination of several adjustments. 
We have listed a representative set of stakeholders affected by each of 
the strategies. The cells in the matrix can be used to indicate costs 
and benefits of any strategy. For example, a strategy of subsidized 
flood insurance would involve costs to flood plain residents and 
businesses in the form of premiums, and benef.its in th1; form of claims 
following a disaster; the general taxpayer would incur the costs of 
premium subsidies but would benefit by having to pay for less disaster 
relief. The private .insurance agents would have administrative costs 
of operating the program but would receive commissions for their efforts. 
Sinµlarly, governmental agencies such as the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency (FEMA) would incur program costs, but woul.d .help fulfill 
their responsibility of reducing future flood losses. 
The challenge in developing a meaningful flood plain management 
program is to evaluate data entered in the various cells. in the matrix 
· shown in Figure. 5 and to utilize c-riteria for seleeting among them. A 
flexible decision support system enables policy makers to investigate 
the relative performance of alternative strategies in various situations--
such as the 100-year flood. Sensitivity analysis can be performed to 
determine the impact of different socioeconomic and physical characteris-
tics of the flood prone area or the nature of flooding on the performance 
of different alternatives. The computer facilitates data analysis, stan-
dardizes data bases so policy makers can communic~te with each_other 
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and contrasts the relative performance of different strategies on different 
constituencies. 
The computer does not provide an answer as to which policy or set 
of strategies is most desirable for adoption. Rather it is· a tool 
along with cost/benefit analysis and multiobjective planning for. 
enabling policy makers to weigh the tradeoffs among strategies and to 
arrive at solutio,ns. Policy makers will still have to make r~levant 
value judgments in determining a final course of action. 
Decision support systems can also provide users with insights 
into the impact of other decision makers on their own activities. One 
of the most interesting. recent experiments is the design of a system 
for allocating public goods among individuals. Ferejohn, Forsythe and 
Noll (1977) developed an interactive computer model which enabled public 
broadcasting stations to allocate their budget to different programs 
based on the actions of others. The more stations which selected the 
program, the lower the cost to each individual.station. After an 
initial set of program selections, price information on the various 
programs were disseminated to each individual station and they had an 
opportunity to revise their choices. Within a relatively small number 
of iterations a stable solution was found. 
--·------· 
The important lesson of this experiment for our purposes is the· 
opportunity of providing decentralized information to resource managers 
who have to allocate a budget among a number of activities. A similar 
mechanism for eliciting preferences through prices may lead to more efficient 
allocation of scarce resources and better coordination between fedreal, state 
and local agencies facing similar problems. In contrast to,the PBS 
system where there is a budgetary decision which must be made at regular 
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intervals, no specific deadlines force coordination in the area of 
resource management. By developing an interactive system for communica-
tion, there may be opportunities for sharing .data and bringing groups 
facing the same problems to address their budgetary allocation decisions 
more systematically. 
The use of decision support systems £or policy making purposes is 
only as good as the assumptions made by users. In the case of 
resource management problems which_involve a number of interested 
parties, each having their own objectives, detailed analyses of the 
impact of different programs have to be made. For such tools to be 
useful, there must be an explicit recognition of the criteria on which 
policies must be judged, as well as the constraints under which one is 
operating. These are the basic ingredients for any choice model, as 
Gilbert White has stressed in his papers on the subject and in his 
public service activities. He has been instrumental in awakening public 
and private decision makers·to the need for systematically evaluating 
different alternatives. The extent to which we can reap the benefits 
of his efforts rests with our future endeavors. 
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Footnotes 
1. Utility curves are unique up to a linear transformation. 
Hence, two end points can be arbitrarily specified and ihe other 
points on the curve estimated in relation to these two. For an 
excellent introduction to the properties of utility functions and ways 
to assess them, see Keeney and Raiffa (1976, Chapter 5). 
2. The seminal work·in this area is by Stigler (1961). Exten-
sions of the analysis of and a comprehensive set of references on the 
subject appears in Rothschild (1974). 
3. The nature qf the activity is based .on the classification 
scheme described by White and Haas (1975).' They categorize different 
measures as either modifying the causes of the hazard (e.g., cloud 
seeding of a hurricane), modifying the vulnerability to the event 
(e.g., flood proofing) or distributing losses (e.g., insurance), p. 57. 
4. A more extensive discussion of the selection of a discount 
rate appears in the chapter by Platt in this volume. 
5. For purposes of this review, we will not dwell on the detailed 
calculations-of benefits and costs. The water resources area has 
been the subject of a number of excellent analyses using this technique. 
See, for example, Krutilla and Eckstein (1958), Hirshleifer, DeHaven and 
Hilliman (1960), and Haveman (1965). A comprehensive summary of the 
benefit-cost methodology can be found in Herfindahl and Kneese (1974). 
6. For example, local cost-sharing on levees ranged from 0% to 49.7% 
and channel improvements from 7.8% to 54.3%. 
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7. A more detailed discussion of this process is found in Keeney 
and Raiffa (1976). 
8. Programming approaches for structuring and solving these 
problems have been developed in the literature (see Dyer, '1972) and have 
been proposed for solving specific resource management problems 
(e.g., Charnes, Cooper, Karwan and Wallace, 1979). 
9. For a description of these group techniques for program 
planning see Delbecq, Van de Ven and Gustafson (1975). 
10. Russell (1979) contains a set of papers which describe 
empirical tests of alternative theories of public decision making. 
11. A more detailed discussion of the impact that ordering the 
items has on choice can be found in Plott and Levine (l978). 
12. A more detailed description of the Flood Insurance Program 
and its changes appears in the chapter by Platt in this volume. The 
discussion here supplements Platt's historical review by calling 
special attention to the relationship between crises arld legislation. 
13. This definiton is taken from Keen and Scott-Morton's (1978) 
book on the subject (p. 1). 
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Table 1 
Practical Range of Adjustments and Consequences to Ms. Waterman 
Loss 
Probability 
Adjustment: 
Bear Loss Herself 
a Flood Insurance 
Federal Reliefb 
Elevating Housec 
No Flooding 
0 
.90 
0 
-$50 
0 
-$2,000 
State of Nature 
Minor Flooding 
-$6,000 
.09 
-$6,000 
-$ 250 
-$4,000 
-$2,000 
Severe Flooding 
-$20,000 
.01 
-$20,000 
-$ . 250· 
-$18,000 
-$ 6,000 
a We are assuming $20,000 coverage at 2.50 per $1,000 and the following 
deductible schedule -- maximum ($200, 2% of loss). 
b For illustration purposes, we are assuming a $2,000 forgiveness grant 
and no low interest loans. 
c We assume elevating the structure cost at $2,000. 
Table 2 
Ms. Waterman's Prior Estimates of River Height 
Less than ,J5 feet 
35f-45 feet 
More than 45 feet 
Probability 
.90 
.09 
.01 
Event 
No Flooding 
Minor Flooding 
Severe Flooding 
-
__ , ____ _) 
( 
Adjustments 
Flood 
proofing 
Elevate 
house 
Insurance 
Federal 
Relief 
Desired 
state 
Table 3 
Four Aspects of Choice 
for Evaluating Flood Adjustments 
Nature of 
Activity 
.3* 
Modify Vulnerability 
Modify Vulnerability 
Distribute Losses 
Distribute Losses 
Modify Vulnerability 
Time to Get 
Information 
.l* 
High 
Medium 
Medium 
Low 
Low-Medium 
Predisaster 
~Gos::t 
.4* 
Medium 
High 
Low 
Low 
Low-Medium 
* Importance weight 
Postdisaster 
Cost 
.2* 
Medium 
Low 
Low 
High 
Low 
Sector 
Low Income 
Middle Income 
High Income 
Sector 
Low Income 
Middle Income 
High Income 
TABLE 4 
EVALUATION OF TWO PROJECTS UTILIZING 
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 
Project A 
Benefits 
Expected 
Annual Savings in Project 
Flood Damage Cost 
500 
100 
80 
680 600 
Project B 
Benefits 
Discounted Expected 
Annual Savings in Project 
Flood Damage Cost 
120 
130 
400 
-
650 500 
NOTE: All benefits and costs in thousands of dollars. 
;.::...l 
Net Benefits 
80 
Net Benefits 
150 
------ ----------
Perceived 
Environmental 
Characteristics 
Information 
Processing 
Final 
Choice 
Figure 1. The Decision-Making Process 
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Options 
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Processing 
Action 
LOSSES 
(Thousands of Dollars) 
20 18 /6 14 /2 10 8 6 4 2 0 
Figure 2. Ms. Waterman's utility function for different losses 
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Figure 3. Decision tree for Ms. Waterman's adjustment. 
Expected 
Disutility 
-L.80 
-.~.10 
-:-1. 93 
-5.15 
Process l 
Insurance 
Federal Relief 
Maintain 
Flood Proofing 
Elevating House 
Elevate Flood 
House Proofing 
FINAL 
CHOICE 
---------· ------- _________ , 
Process 2 
Elevating 
House 
Flood Proofing 
Insurance 
Federal Relief 
Flood Proofing 
Federal Relief 
Insurance 
FINAL 
Figure 4. Two processes using elimination by aspects, 
CHOICE _________ j 
.~ 
' ! 
I 
! 
-~··--·- -·- --~---·--------. ~~,,,,--- ·- ..,. 
_._ 
--·--
··- -----""-
·-· -
---
~----... 
-
Staker:oltlers Flood Plain General Private Government Residents & Communi ti. Sector . Taxpayers Agencies Businesses Groups 
Strategies 
. 
... 
' 
A. Flood l) ... ... roo:r:i.ng 
.. 
B. Subsidized Insurance 
r Land Use Re6:.ilations "'. 
~ . . 
' D. Flood Co:1t.rol Works 
./ 
E. ! 
1 
' 
! 
Conbinations·of 
' 
Diffe:rent Tv:,es 
, ... 
' 
of 
.i 
' Above Approaches 
I t ' 
Figure 5. Strategy - Stakeholder Matrix 
' 
: 
